The David Kelly Incident

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Norman Baker’s book has been generating some questions. It is very encouraging to see that those using FIRE Project portals read the book reviews and take time to email questions and comments. As the FIRE Project is a volunteer-staffed operation, we have scarce volunteer time available for administration. As a result, we have limited the facilities on our portals for group discussion because of the amount of time required in removing spam and unacceptable offensive postings that have become so common on the Internet. At the present rate of emails, we may end up producing a David Kelly FAQ section but, in the meantime, we will attempt to post comment on BSD and Broadly Risks. For those who wish to email questions and comment, please send your emails to editors@broadlyboats.com where we will attempt to respond generically to groups of questions, researching as necessary and posting comment as below:

There are those who are not familiar with the term ‘unlawful killing’ and many inside and outside Britain have become more confused when they learned that the London Metropolitan Police had been found guilty of Health & Safety offences as the result of an unarmed man being held down while police gunmen fired a number of pistol shots into his head from very close range.

When Norman Baker MP began his research into the very strange death of Doctor David Kelly, he started with as open a mind as is possible. The only initial bias appears to have been a suspicion that the death was not suicide. That is a bias only because accidental death did not seem to be a viable alternative and the obvious damage to the body appeared to eliminate the probability of death by natural causes. That only left unlawful death as an alternative to suicide.

As an elected representative, serving in the House of Commons, Baker has a reputation for fairness and integrity, coupled with a determination that Governments must be held accountable for their actions. That he is a Liberal Democrat MP, who voted with his Party against the invasion of Iraq, does not appear to have influenced his approach to the death of David Kelly in any significant way, or at all.

So, What is ‘Unlawful Killing’?

The category of unlawful death does not only mean murder, but covers a number of forms of killing that have no legal justification.

The Met police death squad that executed, in error, the unfortunate Brazilian, at Stockwell Tube Station, would claim that their action was not murder, but it clearly was unlawful, even if, in the most generous assessment, it was retrospectively seen that the victim was not a terrorist, and a man who posed absolutely no threat. In that example, British law does offer several possible ways of judging the level of guilt for the gunmen and their commanders. It has already been judged to be an offence under the Health and Safety legislation. With the coroner yet to reach a judgment, it is entirely possible that a verdict of manslaughter or murder could be produced, and even that individuals may be named as perpetrators, which might then lead to a criminal prosecution where those prosecuted could be found guilty of one of the forms of unlawful killing. In this example it is most unfortunate that an inquest was not held within days of the killing, while a full independent investigation was conducted and a file present to the Crime Prosecution Service. Had that approach been adopted, it would have been possible to dispense justice in a way that could be seen to be fair and swift. In the event, attempts by the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, aided and abetted by the Government, to avoid or downgrade any investigation led to the use of the Health and Safety laws which were never originally intended to be used in this way. It may be that the highly unfavourable report of the IPC, following on the heels of the Health and Safety prosecution, and due to be followed by a corner’s report and threat of a possible private prosecution brought by the victim’s family, may yet trigger a full criminal trial brought by the State against individual police officers. Somewhere in that chain of events, the Metropolitan Police Commissioner may yet do the honourable, if belated, thing and resign.

Most legal systems acknowledge there should be categories for killing.

Some systems recognize a crime of passion where the death has resulted from a fit of uncontrolled anger that is considered to be unique to that single human relationship and where the killer is thought most unlikely to kill again. That is not provided in the British system, although it can be argued that judges have some leeway during sentencing and may consider this issue as a form of mitigation, following a verdict of manslaughter or murder.

Most systems accept that there will be killings where the killer is not responsible for his or her actions because of a serious mental disorder. In some cases the killer will stand trial and be found guilty, with the mitigation that he or she was not able to exercise control, and responsibility was consequently reduced. In other cases the killer is considered unfit to plead because the mental condition renders that person incapable of any logical thought. The British system recognizes these possibilities although, as in any similar justice system, the dividing line between mad and bad can be very difficult to call.

Then there are killings where the killer had no deliberate intent, death being due to negligence, rather than as a deliberate act. Beyond those categories that address killings, where the killer either had no deliberate intent, or where temporarily, or for a longer period, the killer was not fully in control of his or her actions, deliberate killing is seen to cover a number of degrees. The British legal system recognizes killers without full, or any, mental control as a result of illness, and it recognizes individual and corporate killing by accident or negligence. It now additionally recognizes killing by shooting as a Health and Safety issue along with worn carpet or unguarded machines in factories.

Manslaughter is a category where the killer is seen to be able to offer some mitigation, although it might also be used by prosecutors where they know that they have weak evidence for a murder trial and the matter can be disposed of if the defendant pleads guilty to the lesser crime of manslaughter, in return for a reduced sentence.

That leaves the category of murder and the British system has no method of grading the seriousness of the crime, leaving this to the judge in sentencing, where a sentence tariff offers the judge some latitude. With the removal of the death penalty, a judge has limited scope for dealing with the most awful crimes, such as the cases of serial killers who have concentrated on child victims and killed in particularly cruel and brutal ways. There will be those who regard any killing as the ultimate and most terrible act perpetrated against society and the individual, but there are also those who argue that each case of murder presents its own unique characteristics and that a fair system of justice should be able to recognize these variations in degree and culpability.

In the case of David Kelly, the probability of unlawful killing seems to be overwhelming and Baker presents the available evidence and draws some conclusions. He, as are we all, is seriously hampered because of the bizarre way in which the Blair Brown regime responded to the death. Although the intent was clearly to hide a number of uncomfortable truths and to exploit David Kelly in a war being waged against the BBC by the Blair Brown regime Propaganda Ministry, the result is that it has created fertile ground for conspiracy theories. Baker had to plough through a pile of these in a valiant attempt to produce a fair and well balanced view of the incident.

It is never too late to conduct a thorough investigation and review the resulting evidence effectively in a coroner’s court, a formally constituted judicial review, or in a criminal court. Improved forensic methods are demonstrating regularly that cold cases can be brought back up to courtroom temperature and prosecuted successfully. Until a Government is elected that has the will to follow this path, we are faced with a wealth of inconsistencies.

Baker has done a good job of researching and answering some of these, but has also inevitably introduced some new inconsistencies in the process.

All we know from the publicly available information, and the observations of leading forensics and medical specialists, is that suicide, in the way that it was presented and accepted during the Hutton whitewash, is highly improbable. Baker demonstrates that there was no clear motive for David Kelly to commit suicide and there are many pieces of information that suggest his motivation was so far from that, he is most unlikely to have taken his own life. The range of medical opinions from skilled specialists strongly questions the alleged methods of suicide. These experts point out that even had a strong motive been demonstrated, the methods claimed to have been employed are highly improbable. That leaves the only possibility that a third party was involved in the death. At the very least, this suggests an assisted suicide which is an unlawful killing under current British law, although the Blair Brown regime has been very keen to introduce new laws that would permit third parties to assist in suicide and to terminate life, for example, to assist in reducing the cost of health care. The higher probability from the inconsistencies and available public information is that David Kelly died without co-operating with his killer. Under the same available evidence, it is most probable that the death was murder because it would have required a level of premeditation and actions that it could not be downgraded to manslaughter.

We are now at a point where only a fresh and independent review, followed by whatever action seems appropriate, to clear the matter. The longer that it is allowed to fester, the more theories will emerge, the more confusion will be created and the memory of a dedicated and hardworking public servant will tarnished by the related slurs and innuendoes. Eventually, the confusion will reach the point, already reached in the case of Diana Spencer, former Princess of Wales, where no amount of new evidence or new reviews and trials will satisfy everyone.

IJB

IMO has a good record but more needs to be done, Secretary-General tells delegates as 25th IMO Assembly opens

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IMO has a good and improving record in enhancing safety and security at sea and preventing marine pollution from ships, but more needs to be done, Secretary-General Efthimios E. Mitropoulos told delegates at the opening (on Monday, 19 November) of the 25th session of the Organization’s governing body, the Assembly. The meeting is being attended by more than 1,000 delegates from IMO Member States as well as international and non-governmental organizations.

In his opening address, Mr. Mitropoulos pointed out that, during the last 10 years, the amount of cargo carried by sea has tripled, ships have increased in numbers, size and complexity, and their service characteristics (including speed, endurance, propulsive efficiency, emissions, automation, strength, fatigue life and even coatings) have significantly improved. At the same time, he added, safety has increased threefold; loss of life, cargo and ships have fallen, security has improved and oil spills have been reduced to one-third or less of the level they were at 10 years ago.

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A Monumental Blunder – Again!!!

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The Scottish Prime Minister, non-elect, Gordon “Bottler” Brown as the Times cartoonist saw him

Bruised, battered and bleeding, the Blair Brown regime staggers from one disaster to another. Just when we think that nothing worse can happen they spectacularly prove us wrong.

The latest catastrophic failure is another spectacular from the Treasury brief of the puppet Chancellor Darling. In funereal tones he informed the House of Commons that, under his watch, the personal and banking details of more than 23 million British citizens and children had been lost. He expressed regret, someway short of apology, and then suggested that having ‘apologized’ it was time to move on. Underlings went on to claim that yet another inquiry had begun, suggesting that we should all wait until it delivered its findings.

As a policeman might say, at the scene of an incident, ” There’s nothing to see – so move along”

Since 1997, an amazing catalogue of disasters has defined the Blair Brown regime. At each turn new inquiries have begun and been used as an excuse for awaiting their reports. When those reports have eventually been released the media spotlight has been turned to the latest disaster, the new inquiry begun to find out how this latest catastrophe might have happened, and to identify a very junior civil servant to take the blame. This process of avoiding responsibility for major problems that have been due to either incompetence or wilful maladministration has become the hallmark of the Blair Brown regime. Apart from hiding problems that should have been exposed and addressed, this avoidance of accountability has created an environment where there is no encouragement to change behaviour, leading on to the next costly mistakes.

Of course, one difficulty for the Blair Brown regime in taking responsibility is that they would long ago have run out of people who had not already resigned for some major mistake or offence. As it has been, disgraced Ministers have been brought back, sometimes rapidly, because there was no one else to choose from.

This latest failure is chilling. It should chill not only British citizens, but any citizen, in any country, where vast government databases are being created.

Whether an individual volunteers to provide personal and sensitive information, or is forced by legislation to provide it, a government has a primary duty to respect and protect that information.

The scale of this latest failure is mind blowing.

The personal details of parents and children were loaded onto two CDs and sent by an unregistered mail system to the National Audit Office. It appears that one civil servant was able to make this copy of more than 23 million sets of information without any supervision or counter signature, and then simply place the disks into a padded envelope that was left in the post tray without any signature being required, even within the building. When the disks failed to arrive with the addressee, the civil servant made another copy and posted two more disks, which appear to have arrived. It is unclear how the original postal loss was reported, although the Chancellor and the Prime Minister appear to have been informed of the catastrophe more than ten days before an announcement was made to Parliament.

Now that one complete set of personal records has been lost, it has to be assumed that the records have already fallen, or will shortly fall, into the hands of criminals. Identity fraudsters, forgers, terrorists, paedophiles, extortionists, and burglars are just a few of the undesirables who could profit from the records. The disks are priceless, even to marketing organizations. Even if the disks eventually turn up somewhere, it has to be assumed that they have at some point been in the hands of unauthorized individuals and that their contents could have been copied.

This is a terrible situation, which will cause immense suffering. Every adult who had sensitive private information recorded on the disks will now go in fear. They will never be free of that fear and neither will the children. At any time in the future they may become the victim of some crime. Many of the children involved are vulnerable for one reason or another. Should details of their current addresses fall into the wrong hands, major crimes may be committed.

The immediate question is how the risk can be reduced for these 23 million innocent victims of the Blair Brown regime.

There is no easy answer.

Every debit/credit card holder on the list should immediately change PIN numbers, which are often the birth dates of the holder, or one of the holder’s children. The same applies to passwords and security phrases, which are frequently based on family and personal names, postcodes and birth dates.

In most cases, the bank details of the parents formed part of the lost records. To reduce risk the account numbers and any security information should be immediately changed and consideration be given to moving the accounts to another bank.

In many cases, the parents will have to consider relocation and new jobs. This may appear draconian panic measurers, but some will be single parents with custody of children that may be subject to abduction or attack by parents who failed to win custody. There will also be some children where a paedophile risk exists.

Unfortunately, the loss of the information presents a continuing threat whatever action the victims decide to take. If the records are in the hands of criminals, or later fall into their hands, they provide a starting point for further investigation. Having details such as dates of births and banking details enables a criminal to follow the changes that may be made to reduce the immediate risk. For those who face special risk because of their personal situations, only the kind of protection offered to ‘super grass’ criminals and political defectors under witness relocation schemes will provide any real reduction of risk.

Although security specialists have been quick to talk about immediate risks, the most pernicious aspect of the failure is that criminals and terrorists can be patient and wait for years before exploiting vulnerability. They are also adept at using one set of information as a starting point from which to build up a script. Having personal details of 23 million people is a huge step into building a very large and sophisticated attack database that will develop over time and allow it to be integrated with information obtained from other sources. In particular, a set of 23 million personal records is an excellent starting point for targeting, because they can be matched against all of the personal information, such as census and electoral registration data, that has so rashly been placed on the Internet by the Blair Brown regime.

The seriousness of the situation cannot be overstressed too much. It is a major catastrophe that affects a major percentage of the British population.

The failure is so great that real accountability should involve the resignation not just of the Chancellor, but of the whole Government, and the permanent withdrawal from public life of all of the key players, including the Prime Minister and the Chancellor.

Of course that will not happen. The Blair Brown regime will attempt to do what they have done in the past and that is to ‘tough it out’ in the hope that public opinion will eventually be diverted elsewhere. After all, if you can get away with war crimes, you can get away with anything.

If there is little that can be done to reduce risk for the victims, and nothing that can be done to completely remove risk, there are the matters of compensation and prevention of such a catastrophe ever occurring again.

How can the victims be adequately compensated?

The short answer is that nothing can be done to fully compensate the victims because it is impossible to calculate the full extent of loss.

If a victim of the Government failure becomes victim of an identity fraudster, the Government could repay any direct losses the victim suffers, but there is no way of knowing how many people have gained access to the personal details, or may gain access at some point in the future. Crimes of this nature could be perpetrated at any point up to the death of the youngest child recorded on the disks, and even beyond death.

Some crimes may not involve financial loss. Victims of paedophiles can never be fully compensated with money. Anyone who is killed is beyond compensation and no sum of money can effectively compensate relatives of the dead person.

Where victims are at special risk, the cost of relocating and developing a new identity will be a very costly process. The most desperate cases may be dealt with covertly under existing Government schemes that have been set up to protect witnesses and criminals released back into society after completing sentences for high profile crimes. In such cases, millions may be spent to protect the subjects and continue for the rest of their lives. Unfortunately, some of those listed on the disks may already be under some form of protection scheme. This will immediately require a move and new identities for parents and children affected. In itself, this would add new cost, but the danger exists that the lost records could be used to identify how the programmes are operated and lead to criminals using this information to attack witnesses and others under protection.

The special risk victims are almost an easy group to compensate because their need for protection has been previously assessed and Government has accepted the financial and organizational responsibility for their protection.

The major difficulty is for the millions of victims who are not in this special group. The reality is that they will be at risk of long-term stress and at risk from criminals for the rest of their lives.

So, if very little can be done to correct the results of a catastrophic failure, what can be done to ensure the situation is never repeated?

This is an even greater problem, any solution would be very costly and require significant resources.

Addressing some of the most heinous failures is relatively easy but this only addresses a small part of the problem.

Before the advent of the Blair Brown regime, British Governments had followed a formal security policy that was risk averse and had been introducing a more flexible risk management approach that was based on Multi-Level Security. The basic principle of MLS is that data is only protected relative to its estimated sensitivity. When low value data is combined with more sensitive data, it is reclassified to the level of the more sensitive data. In many cases, both sets of data may be reclassified to a higher level that the level of the most sensitive individual data, because data aggregation has created a new composite data that is much more sensitive than the individual components. The classification and/or sensitivity of the data is used to determine how the data is accessed and used, by which authorized users.

MLS is a complex environment, but it does permit a number of information systems, located on many sites, to transfer data amongst themselves at an acceptable level of risk. It is not a cheap environment and it requires great care not just in building the systems, but in setting the procedures and addressing the related staffing issues. For these reasons, MLS has only been widely used in command and control systems for the military and the intelligence communities. Prior to 1997, it was being introduced into some of the most sensitive civil government departments, such as Treasury and Health. One of its fundamental principles was that no single individual would have full administrative powers and that a very strong, and heavily protected, audit trail was created, that could not be changed by any individual, or group.

From the start of the Blair Brown regime these plans were largely ignored in favour of a large number of highly ambitious and risky information systems that were based on the principle that any Central, or Local, Government employee, or Quango, could access any personal information held on British citizens. This policy also extended to the concept of new stealth taxes where citizen’s personal information was sold. In some cases, notably the DVLC drivers’ and vehicles’ records database, information was merrily sold to convicted criminals and those awaiting prosecution. The Blair Brown regime became adept at ignoring the Data Protection Commissioner when it suited their purpose and hiding behind Data Protection when they wanted to conceal information.

It would appear that most British Government information systems are not fit for purpose and some have been scandalous disasters, where a lack of adequate risk management is a common thread.

The immediate risk reduction measure would be to revert to risk aversion for all systems that were not full MLS information systems with formal accreditation.

This would involve disconnecting most systems from public networks, such as the Internet and the public phone networks. Once disconnected, each standalone system would see a significant reduction of risk immediately.

That would not be a complete solution. Each system would require a complete review of security and procedures. The easy part would be in setting secure operating procedures.

In the case of a single system, only authorized personnel would be permitted access and their use of the system would be fully audited. No administrator would have ‘super-user’ privileges, which would mean that one person would not be free to roam anywhere in the system, access and modify any data and print or copy data without leaving an audit trail. This approach does not guarantee that data crime cannot be committed, but it does mean that it is considerably more difficult to perpetrate and that an evidence trail would be available for a subsequent prosecution.

This approach would detail how data could leave the system. Any printed documents would be recorded, not only in the system audit trail, but also in a physical record maintained by every authorized user, recording when the print was made, who it was sent to, and how it was sent. Some data would be print prohibited because of its sensitivity.

Electronic copies would be subject to additional controls. As it is now possible to record several gigabytes of data on a USB device the size of a keyfob, it is impossible to prevent data being smuggled out, but it is possible to require records and justifications for data legitimately copied onto such devices. It is also possible to reduce the number of locations where the copies can be made, and it is possible to prevent all, but a small number of carefully checked individuals, from copying data in a particular way, with the result that most users would have to request a copy and sign for it when provided by security personnel.

Much the same applies to portable computers, some of which are now pocket-sized mobile phones. Reducing the choice for the transfer of data and the making of copies is both an administrative matter and a technical matter.

Where data is allowed to leave the system on storage devices, and in portable computers, it can, and should, be protected by encryption. It is incredible that 23 million sensitive records could be allowed out of a system on CD disks in a single postal package without at least being protected by encryption. They appear to have been password-protected but passwords can be very easily broken. Even using very cheap Personal Computers in a cluster allows a very powerful password breaking system to be constructed, using software downloaded from the Internet. Encryption can also be broken but it is a much more difficult task.

To reduce risk further, no complete database systems should be sent out in a single package. The cost of CD and other storage media is so low that a large database could be easily split up into many elements, and each could be sent separately, using different couriers and different times. Each package would then be signed for at each stage and date and time stamped. Sensitive personal data should never be sent through a system that does not physically protect and record access for the whole of the journey. If cost was a major consideration, the alternative is for the disks to be locked in a security briefcase and carried from the data centre to the recipient by a Government employee.

To dramatically reduce risk, no Government department should ever hold information that is not strictly necessary to its duties, and never share any of that data with any other Government department, or agency, or third party, without either the express permission of the owner of the information, or an accountable legal process that can be scrutinized by a judge, or regulator, at any time without prior notice.

Moving back to an environment of risk management is possible and, if possible, should be done with despatch.

As most of the measures are simple common sense we might wonder why this is not the default situation.

The reality is that the Blair Brown regime has charged off in a cavalier manner, ignoring precedent and advice, unless it was something they wanted to hear. This combination of ignorance, arrogance, and incompetence, has flowed through every aspect of government since 1997.

Highly questionable contract procurements have added to the problem, as cronies were favoured, and incompetent, or greedy, contractors were not brought to account for contract failures, often being rewarded with even larger contracts. That has not just been the process in respect of information systems, but it has been most marked in that area.

Already there is a raft of projects that are behind schedule, over budget, under performing and otherwise unacceptable. The National Health data system is both the largest computer project ever undertaken anywhere in the world, and also one of the most seriously flawed and incompetently executed.

To crown a decade of mind numbing incompetence, the Blair Brown regime is determined to press ahead with a national ID system that will introduce Soviet-style internal passports for the first time in Britain. This will provide them with the means to lose the highly personal details of every citizen, producing a range of problems that need not be created.

The one area that makes even simple risk reduction difficult is a total lack of control over immigration. The Blair Brown regime has also been forced to admit that even the Prime Minister’s armoured car was guarded by an illegal immigrant who had been given security clearance, just one of thousands of others who are illegally in Britain, but have been cleared to work in security posts and in jobs that bring them into contact with young children. We can only guess how many may be employed on Government information projects and systems.

IJB

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Another Death On The Tube

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As MAC of the Daily Mail saw it

It was reported today by the London’s Met Police that a terrorist had been shot on a London Underground train.

The senior officer in command of the operation reported that a man, believed to be Osama bin Laden, had been followed from a flat in North London, that had been under surveillance. The suspect first took a bus and then switched to a taxi before switching back to a bus. He was then followed into the Tube Station at Camberwell where he was seen to vault the ticket barrier and run down the stairs to platform two.

The suspect’s identity was confirmed although he was dressed in the uniform of a Metropolitan Police Commissioner. Armed officers, disguised as protestors, were instructed to slot him. Armed officers opened fire to protect the public. The suspect was reported dead at the scene.

Late Breaking News

A police spokesman reported that a small mistake had been made by officers, members of an elite Met Police death squad, during the trailing and arrest of a suspect who had been believed to be Osama bin Laden. The spokesman admitted that the victim was Sir Ian Warwick Blair, Metropolitan Police Commissioner. “Well,” he said, “its an easy mistake to make”

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Osama bin Laden (left) and Sir Ian Blair (right-wing) could easily be mistaken for each other by armed police in the heat of the moment

Asked how the mistake had been possible, the police spokesman said “we wus watching this flat an this bloke comes out. He looked suspicious, carrying a fat brief case under one arm. How wus we to know as how it just contained wads of money from expenses claims? Anyway, no one takes a bus and then switches to a taxi in London and then we becomes more suspicious when he gets onto a bus again, then down the Tube. It was rowdy in the control room cause we wus having a party for Sgt Bent as ‘as just retired early ‘fore any nosy parker can check his expenses claims. Seems the MI5 man said ‘doesn’t Blair look like bin Laden without a beard – sorta as a joke – well its kinda funny yeah – and Commander Dickhead whats in charge thought that was a positive ID. Then we ‘ad trouble gettin hold of the gunmen from SO19 – they was having a late breakfast. One thing led to another and Boom Banga Bang, new Commissioner required”. The spokesman continued, “well anyways you can’t make omelets without breakin a few eggs can you?”

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Fear of Fear – a Media Crime – Weapons of Mass Distraction

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When the revolution in electronic communications began, there was much to look forward to. The world would shrink as telecommunications provided instant access to friends, relatives and colleagues across the globe. Knowledge would grow as every person connected to the new global networks would have instant and free access to the knowledge of the world. We would know instantly about news from any part of the world as it broke. This seemed a Utopia.

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Unfortunately, the undoubted benefits have come at a high price. The information overload, which has resulted from global communications and access to vast stores of information, has created an environment where manipulation of news and information creates fear, suspicion and prejudice. It has proved a priceless gift to unscrupulous polititians and commercial interests. Skilled propagandists and marketers are able to implant false knowledge and desire to their own advantage.

At the lower end of the propaganda spectrum, people are persuaded to purchase products that they did not want, did not need, and which may be harmful to their interests. The resulting consumer society has been spreading across the globe, consuming finite resources in an orgy of waste. Consumers have been led to believe that they really need multiple layers of packing material and that cheap products with limited life or poor quality are exactly what they need.

The Scream

At the other end of the spectrum, unscrupulous politicians have been creating a climate of fear to enable them to remove civil liberty and democratic choice.

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The Millennium Bug saw billions of dollars wasted on unnecessary work on information systems. Those few countries that resisted the panic suffered no problems as their computer clocks moved to 2000. In Britain the then Home Secretary Jack Straw was apparently planning to use helicopter gun ships against the population which was expected to riot during the Armageddon days of the Millennium Bug.

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BSE was expected to wipe out most of the population of meat eaters. This infection proved to be significantly less damaging than had been predicted. Where millions of victims were expected to die a horrible death, as their brains and nervous systems were destroyed, only a handful of cases have been diagnosed.

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Global terrorism was produced as the greatest threat to mankind. The attacks on New York and Washington by a handful of religious fanatics were presented as a second Pearl Harbour. It became part of the justification for wars that were really fought for other reasons. In Britain, the Islamic fanatics have proved to be significantly less effective than their Irish counterparts who waged war against British civilians for extreme minority religious and political reasons.

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We have also been faced with fear of Global Warming. This fear is going to cost trillions of dollars fighting something that is not what the manipulators claim it to be. In the process, people will suffer extreme hardship and even death.

Every day a new health scare story is launched. Today it may be a claim that salt is a deadly toxin. Tomorrow it may be a claim that salt is vital to good health.

Even the less unscrupulous are finding that, to gain attention, they must dress their beliefs, or discoveries, in the most extreme and terrifying language. To be heard against the thunderous background noise of communications is becoming increasingly difficult.

Finding a solution is not going to be easy but, if we fail to address this very real problem, we could be buried under a dead weight of communication and propaganda.

As with many other dangerous substances it is easy to become addicted to 24 hour news. Maybe the place to start would be to fight the addiction. We need to find time to ask questions and not just accept pre-packaged thoughts implanted by others to their perceived advantage.

IJB

The Strange Death of David Kelly

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Norman Baker MP has performed a great public service in researching the circumstances surrounding the David Kelly incident, and demonstrated a level of integrity and public service that has become woefully rare amongst politicians. This is a book that deserves and demands to be read. The unlawful killing of Dr David Kelly, and the subsequent cover up, are amongst the most serious incidents in a decade of Blair Brown regime national socialism. Dr David Kelly was a nice man, a quiet man, an honest man, a family man. He spent his life as a dedicated public servant, working in the area of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. In his field he had no superior and few equals.

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Immigration

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Nigel Farage, MEP, Leader UK Independence Party

UKIP Leader Nigel Farage is one of the guests on a major debate on “Immigration” on BBC Five Live at 10p.m. on Thursday 8th November.

The same topic is being debated on Newsnight (BBC2) and the two programmes are being combined for the first time. No details yet as to the other guests.

Radio Five Live can be found on 909 & 693MW.

Vision – What Vision?

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Gordon “Bottler” Brown, Scottish Prime Minister non-elect

Yesterday Bottler got the opportunity to describe his “vision” for Britain as he attempted to present the forthcoming programme for legislation. David Cameron put him on the ropes at the start of round one and kept him there. Chalk faced, Bottler stood hunched at the Despatch Box, his hands shaking violently – had he been imbibing Scotland’s most famous product too liberally, was he on the verge of explosion, had he been plugged into the Commons electricity supply, was he suffering some debilitating illness of old age? Well lots of questions, few answers, so not a lot changed.

The new legislative programme appears to be a retread of tired old Blair projects mixed in with policies stolen from the Conservatives – not an original thought amongst them and no vision.

Newsdesk

Bottler’s Heroes

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Gordon “Bottler” Brown, Scottish prime Minister non-elect

Real heroes are being mobilized in a desperate attempt by Bottler to convince voters that he is not Scottish and not the whimp he keeps proving himself to be.

Its a bit rich for a man who has done so much to ensure British forces are placed in harms way with inadequate weapons, equipment and supplies, to now write a book about real heroes of the British Forces.

Newsdesk

Digital Photography Manual

B1482

This manual follows the Haynes traditional format of heavy illustration and concise text in a logical progression from selection through operation and maintenance to provide best value from the subject of the manual. After a hesitant start, digital photography has suddenly taken off and almost eliminated the film camera. Professional photographers will continue to use film for specific types of photography, in the same way that some specialist photographers find a hand-built reproduction of an ancient plate camera indispensable in their specialization. There are still some forms of photography where the digital camera cannot produce the artistic or technical image required. Those forms are becoming progressively rarer as the digital camera achieves ever-higher definition, faster shooting and faster automation.

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